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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The most significant development in Georgia evidence law during the
survey period, as in the past two survey periods, was the continued effort
to adopt a new Georgia evidence code based upon the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The State Bar of Georgia is firmly committed to the adoption
of the Georgia Rules of Evidence and has vigorously lobbied for the proposed rules in each of the past two sessions of the Georgia General Assembly. Although no organized opposition has arisen to the proposed
rules, the rules have yet to be adopted. In the 1991 session of the General
Assembly, as in the 1990 session, the rules were approved by the Senate,
but bogged down in the House Judiciary Committee for the remainder of
the session. The rules will carry over to the 1992 session.
II. OBJECTIONS
The court of appeals decision in King v. State1 provides a good example of the need for precise objections, although it can be argued that few
objections would meet the rigid standard applied by the court in King. In
King defendant contended the trial court improperly restricted his crossexamination of the alleged victim concerning the victim's prior arrest. On
appeal, defendant argued this evidence was admissible to demonstrate
the victim's possible motive for cooperating with the prosecution. Prior to
trial, the trial court ruled that the victim could be impeached only with
certified copies of prior convictions. Defendant contended, however, that
he did not want to impeach the victim's general credibility with evidence
of prior criminal activity, which is properly done only through the use of
a certified copy of a conviction. Rather, defendant wanted this evidence
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
College (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,

State Bar of Georgia.
1. 194 Ga. App. 770, 391 S.E.2d 769 (1990).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

to demonstrate a specific motive.2 The court of appeals did not reach this
substantive issue concluding that there was "nothing in the record to support the assertion that the trial court's grant of the motion erroneously
served to preclude appellant from cross-examining the victim as to the
possible existence of a specific 'deal' for his trial testimony."' The court
held that the bare ruling of the trial court was not error; a felony conviction cannot be proved through cross-examination when it is offered to
impeach the general credibility of the witness.' Apparently the court
thought defendant should have more clearly specified his reason for wanting to cross-examine the victim about his arrest. In her dissenting opinion, Judge Beasley, joined by Judges Deen and Banke, argued that the
trial court's ruling improperly curtailed defendant's right of cross-examination.' Judge Beasley, concluding that the majority viewed the facts
"too narrowly," thought the trial court's ruling pre-empted defendant's
attempt to attack the witness' credibility by demonstrating a specific motive to testify against defendant.' While it is arguable that the majority
drew too fine a line, it is nevertheless important to make clear the purpose for which evidence is being offered. The testimony defendant sought
to elicit was clearly inadmissible to impeach general credibility. On the
other hand, it was clearly admissible to demonstrate the possibility of a
specific motive for offering testimony adverse to defendant. The court's
message is that lawyers must clearly make this point to the trial judge.

III.

RELEVANCY

A. Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence
Extrinsic act evidence is perhaps the most problematic area of evidence
law. Extrinsic act evidence includes any evidence of conduct on occasions
other than the one at issue, and is generally inadmissible.7 However, this
kind of evidence is admissible for many legitimate purposes. Unfortunately, the determination of whether extrinsic act evidence falls within
one of the many of the exceptions to the general rule can be exceedingly
confusing. Although the Georgia appellate courts have done an excellent
job of analyzing extrinsic act evidence, the absence of a clear statutory
framework makes it difficult to obtain quick and precise answers to extrinsic act evidence issues.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 770, 391 S.E.2d at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 772, 391 S.E.2d at 772 (Deen, Banks & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).

6. Id. (Deen, Banke & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (1982).
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The first step in extrinsic act evidence analysis is obviously to determine whether the proffered evidence is actually extrinsic. For example,
the res gestae doctrine, although generally considered an exception to the
hearsay rule, also permits the introduction of evidence of acts other than
the precise act at issue. Furthermore, as discussed in prior surveys, if the
date of an offense is not an essential averment in the indictment, then
any similar events that defendant committed within the applicable period
of limitations are covered in the indictment. Thus, the state can introduce evidence of such offenses even though they are completely separate
from the one actually charged.1 0 This principle was reaffirmed during the
present survey period.1"
If the proffered evidence is extrinsic, the second inquiry is whether the
evidence is being offered as substantive evidence or to impeach or bolster
a witness. For example, evidence of character, which is extrinsic because
it is based on acts other than the one at issue, may be admissible for a
substantive purpose, such as to prove a victim's violent disposition, or to
impeach a witness. Examples of extrinsic act evidence used to impeach a
witness are found below in the discussion of evidentiary issues concerning
witnesses.1 The use of extrinsic act evidence for substantive purposes is
discussed in this section.18
B. Evidence of Similar and Related Transactions
Evidence of similar or related transactions is now commonly admitted
in criminal cases. Appellate reports are replete with perfunctory affirmances of convictions in which prosecutors relied heavily on evidence of
other offenses allegedly committed by the defendant in order to obtain
those convictions. In these cases the courts rarely break new ground, generally restating the principles governing admissibility of similar and related transaction evidence. Such evidence is not admissible to prove that
a person acted in conformity with his prior conduct, but may be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of
conduct.1 ' However, even if extrinsic act evidence is relevant to a legitimate issue, it is not automatically admissible. Prosecutors must first
8. Davis v. State, 194 Ga. App. 833, 392 S.E.2d 253, rev'd on other grounds, 260 Ga.
338, 393 S.E.2d 260 (1990).
9. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MzRcE L. Rav. 225, 228 (1988); Evidqnce, 41
MzRczR

L. Rzv. 175, 178 (1989).

10. See Marc T. Treadweil, Evidence, 40 Mzaciz L. Rzv. 225, 228 (1988); Evidence, 41
MERCER

11.
12.
13.
14.

L. Rzv. 175, 178 (1989).

Nolton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 690, 396 S.E.2d 605 (1990).
See infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 14-62 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 32, 34, 383 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1989).
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prove to the satisfaction of the court that a defendant committed the extrinsic act,"' the extrinsic act is sufficiently similar or related to the
charged offense so that proof of the extrinsic act tends to prove an element of the charged offense, and the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact."
Although Georgia courts permit the liberal use of similar or related
transaction evidence, this tolerance has its limits. In Cross v. State, 7 the
prosecution introduced evidence of the positive results of a drug test. The
State contended that this evidence was admissible as evidence of similar
conduct. Defendant, however, was not charged with drug possession, but
rather was charged with the sale of illegal drugs.'$ The court concluded
that the admission of such evidence "would be taking the issue of the
similarity of acts too far.""9 Evidence of the use of a drug does not prove
motive, intent, plan, or scheme to sell the drug, and it is not sufficiently
similar to the offense of selling illegal drugg.20 Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction."1
In Proulx v. State," the court of appeals held that a plea of nolo contendere in a similar transaction does not bar admission of evidence of the
offense." Although the plea itself is not admissible, the prosecution still
may prove the facts constituting the offense." Similarly, in Tilley v.
State," the court of appeals held that the State may introduce evidence
of a similar offense that resulted in a first offender plea."0 Again, although
the plea itself is inadmissible, the State may prove the facts constituting
the offense.27
Evidence of similar or related transactions can also be admissible in
civil cases, although, ironically enough, courts are generally much more
circumspect in admitting this evidence in civil cases. Perhaps this is because similar or related transaction evidence is generally admitted in
criminal cases because it is relevant to a scienter related issue. In many
15. The reasonable doubt standard does not apply to related or similar transaction
evidence. '
16. See, e.g., French v. State, 237 Ga. 620, 229 S.E.2d 410 (1976); Brock v. State, 254 Ga.
682, 333 S.E.2d 593 (1985).
17. 196 Ga. App. 714, 397 S.E.2d 125 (1990).
18. Id. at 715, 397 S.E.2d at 126.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 715.16, 397 S.E.2d at 126-27.
22. 196 Ga. App. 303, 395 S.E.2d 668 (1990).
23. Id. at 303, 396 S.E.2d at 669.
24. Id.
25. 197 Ga. App. 97, 397 S.E.2d 506 (1990).
26. Id. at 99, 397 S.E.2d at 507.
27. Id. at 98, 397 S.E.2d at 507.
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civil cases, for example, a negligence case, scienter is not an issue and
thus the most frequently used premise for the admission of similar or
related transaction evidence is not present. However, if a party's knowledge or state of mind is a relevant issue, then extrinsic act evidence may
be admissible in civil cases. For example, a plaintiff who alleges that a
proprietor knew or should have known of the likelihood of a criminal attack on the proprietor's premises may
introduce evidence of similar prior
2
transactions to demonstrate notice.
C.

Evidence of Character of Substantive Evidence

In very limited situations, evidence of character is admissible as substantive evidence. For example, criminal defendants sometimes seek to
introduce evidence of a victim's character in order to explain their own
conduct. Although Georgia law permits a defendant to adduce evidence of
the victim's general reputation for violence and evidence of prior specific
threats or assaults against the defendant,' Georgia has historically prohibited the admission of evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim
against third persons."' Last year's survey noted, however, that the
Georgia Supreme Court appeared to be on the verge of changing this long established principle.8 1 In a case decided after the present survey period,
but one nevertheless too significant to ignore in this Article,
the supreme
8 2
court acted to reverse this trend in certain circumstances.
The evolution of the supreme court's position on this issue is fascinating and merits some detailed discussion. As reported in last year's survey, 88 the supreme court in Lolley v. State8" reaffirmed the longstanding
prohibition against the admission of evidence of a victim's acts of violence
against third parties.8 6 In a concurring opinion, Justice Weltner, joined by
Justices Bell and Hunt, argued that cases excluding such evidence should
be re-examined.3' Justice Weltner argued that in certain situations such
evidence would be relevant. For example, according to Justice Weltner, a
defendant attempting to justify his assault should be permitted to prove
28. Haskins v. Lau's Corp., 198 Ga. App. 470, 402 S.E.2d 58 (1991).
29. See McDonald v. State, 182 Ga. App. 509, 356 S.E.2d 264 (1987).
30. See id. at 510, 356 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Clenny v. State, 256 Ga. 123, 344 S.E.2d 216
(1986); Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 331 S.E.2d 532, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1030 (1985),
reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1040 (1986)).
31. See Marc T. Treadwel, Evidence, 42 Mmsza L Rzv. 223, 231-34 (1990).
32. Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991). See infra text accompanying
notes 50-59.
33. See Treadwell, supra note 31, at 231-34.

34. 259 Ga. 605, 385 S.E.2d 285 (1989).
35. Id. at 607, 385 S.E.2d at 286-87.
36. Id. at 607-10, 385 S.E.2d at 287-89 (Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring).
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his knowledge of the victim's violent acts to support his defense that he
reasonably believed his assault was justified. 87 However, Justice Weltner
also argued that such evidence should be admissible even if the defendant
had no knowledge of the victim's violent acts.3s Significantly, Justice
Weltner's opinion was not based upon a similar or related transaction
analysis, but rather was based expressly upon a character evidence analymore probable that a person will act in accordance with his
sis: "'It is,
character (disposition) than that he will act contrary to it.' "" In his dissent, Justice Gregory, joined by Chief Justice Clarke, argued that the evidence should have been admitted as similar transaction evidence rather
than as character evidence.40
Shortly after Loiley, the supreme court in Hill v. State,'1 reaffirmed the
majority holding in Lolley. Again, Justices Weltner and Bell concurred.'4
Justice Weltner wrote that in Lolley "[two justices dissented to the continued application of the rule that the violent character of a deceased
may not be shown by evidence of specific acts of violence against third
persons." 8 Justice Weltner concluded that although the three justices in
Lolley concurred, rather than dissented (because the trial court properly
applied the law then in existence), it was apparent that a majority of the
supreme court was prepared to abrogate the admissibility of evidence of
specific acts of violence against third parties." Actually, as noted above,
the dissent in Lolley did not question the majority's statement that the
character of the victim may not be proved by admission of evidence of
acts against third parties. Rather, the dissent concluded that the evidence
would be admissible to demonstrate a similar transaction.'" Thus, at that
point, it was not clear that the majority of the supreme court favored a
change in the law. Indeed, Justice Gregory's opinion in Chapman v.
State46 suggested that his dissent in Lolley could not be interpreted as an
expression of disapproval of the general rule.
During the present survey period, the supreme court, in Stoudemire v.
State, 7 touched on this issue again. Defendant was convicted of felony
murder and contended that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evi37. Id. at 610, 385 S.E.2d at 288 (Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring).
38. Id. at 609, 385 S.E.2d at 288 (Weltner, Bell & Hunt, JJ., concurring).
39. Id. at 609-10, 385 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 830 n.1,
218 S.E.2d 612 (1975)).
40. Id. at 610, 385 S.E.2d at 289 (Clarke, C.J. & Gregory, J., dissenting).
41. 259 Ga. 655, 386 S.E.2d 133 (1989).
42. Id. at 657, 386 S.E.2d at 135 (Weltner & BeU, JJ., concurring).
43. Id. (Weltner & Bell, JJ., concurring).
44. Id. (Weltner & Bell, JJ., concurring).
45. See supra text accompanying note 37.
46. 259 Ga. 706, 386 S.E.2d 129 (1989).
47. 261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991).
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dence of a prior altercation between the victim and a third person."6 Justice Benham, writing for the majority, acknowledged that "several members of this court have expressed interest in giving consideration to the
admission of evidence of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim against third parties ... ."" However, Justice Benham noted that
even if the law were changed, the change would apply only to cases in
which a defendant contended that his conduct was justified in view of the
victim's character. 50 In Stoudemire defendant argued, however, that the
victim's death was an accident. 1 In such a case, the evidence was clearly
inadmissible. In his dissent, Justice Hunt argued that the evidence was
admissible to show that defendant acted reasonably, but not to prove the
victim's violent character."
These opinions set the stage for the supreme court's decision in Chandler v. State.53 In Chandler defendant asserted the defense of justification .and contended the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of
the victim's prior violent acts involving third parties." Relying upon Hill,
the Georgia Supreme Court held "this enumeration has no merit ... and
therefore presents no reason to reverse the judgment in this case."" Nevertheless, Justice Bell, writing for the majority, continued that the supreme court now found Justice Weltner's concurring opinion in Lolley
"persuasive." Justice Bell added, "[w]e. .. hold that, as of the date this
opinion is published in the advance sheets (September 12, 1991), evidence
of specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons shall be admissible where the defendant claims justification.""0 The court then proceeded to dictate the6 procedure to be followed by parties wishing to introduce such evidence.
Justice Benham, joined by presiding Justice Smith, concurred specially
to note his disagreement with Justice Weltner's concurrence in Lolley."
Justice Benham carefully distinguished the majority's holding with Justice Gregory's dissent in Lolley, which only addressed' the issue of
whether the proffered evidence was admissible as a similar transaction."9
Justice Weltner's, concurring opinion in Lolley, on the other hand, allows
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 49, 401 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 50, 401 S.E.2d at 483.
Id.
Id. .
Id. at 51, 401 S.E.2d at 484 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991).
Id. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407-08, 405 S.E.2d at 673-74.
Id. at 408, 405 S.E.2d at 674 (Benham, J., concurring).
Id. at 409, 405 S.E.2d at 674 (Benham, J., concurring).
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a party to place a victim's character in issue,"0 "and is a move to replace
trial by evidence with trial by character assassination." 61 Justice Benham,
pulling no punches, concluded that "this revolutionary change in the law
of evidence is a throwback to frontier days and gives judicial sanction to a
new defense to murder: the victim 'needed killing.'""
D. Relevancy of Insurance Coverage
Without question, Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, Inc.65 is one
of the most significant evidence decisions rendered by the supreme court
in some time. Prior to July 1, 1987, one of the best known principles of
Georgia law was that a defendant could not introduce evidence that a
collateral source had paid plaintiff's damages. Thus, for example, a defendant could not introduce evidence that a plaintiff's insurance company
had paid his medical expenses.64 This principle, known as the Collateral
Source Rule, was one of the casualties of the so-called Tort Reform Act of
1987."6 The abolition of the Collateral Source Rule had a profound effect
upon all civil trial lawyers who prosecute or defend personal injury
claims. Lawyers representing plaintiffs, in particular, chaffed at the idea
that a plaintiff's insurance coverage could be relevant but that a defendant's liability insurance was not. For this reason, the supreme court in
Denton held that Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 51-12-1(b) violated the equal protection clause of the Georgia
Constitution."
While the general principle that insurance coverage is irrelevant has
been restored, it is always possible, as with much otherwise inadmissible
evidence, for a party to open the door to the introduction of insurance
coverage. For example, in Bridges v. Schier,"7 plaintiff claimed that he
did not undergo a diagnostic test because he did not have the funds to
pay for it. The trial court then allowed defendant to cross-examine plaintiff to establish the availability of no-fault benefits.6" The court of appeals
held that this was not error.69 Plaintiff, by contending that he did not
have resources to pay for the test, opened the door to the introduction of
evidence of insurance coverage.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

259 Ga. 605, 610, 385 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1989).
261 Ga. at 409, 405 S.E.2d at 674 (Benham, J., concurring).

Id.
261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991).
See Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 365 S.E.2d 273 (1988).
1987 Ga. Laws 915 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1(b) (Supp.,1991)).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; 261 Ga. at 42, 402 S.E.2d at 270.
195 Ga. App. 583, 349 S.E.2d 408 (1990).
Id. at 584, 394 S.E.2d at 410.

69. Id.
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E. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible. It would
seem that this principle needs no elaboration or even citation. From the
first days of law school, lawyers are taught that the law seeks to encourage remedial action by allegedly negligent defendants and, therefore,
such evidence will not be admitted against them. Nevertheless, in Gunter
v. Jackson Electric Membership Corp.,10 plaintiffs contended that the
trial court erred when it excluded from evidence portions of a report prepared by defendant concerning the incident at issue. Plaintiffs argued
that the excluded portions, which detailed proposed action to avoid similar incidents, were admissible as an admission against interest."1 The
court of appeals gave this argument short shrift, concluding that the admission of the report would have subverted the policy underlying the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 7' Nevertheless,
plaintiffs, as an alternative ground for their appeal, argued that the report became admissible after defendant's employee testified on direct examination about the excluded portions of the report.73 The court held
74
that this opened the door to admission of the report itself.
F.

Relevancy of Prior Sexual Behavior

Georgia's rape shield statute generally prohibits the admission of evidence that relates to the past sexual behavior of a rape victim."5 The statute provides that such evidence is admissible only if the past sexual behavior directly involved the defendant, and the court finds that the
evidence supports the defendant's contention that the victim consented
to the alleged rape." This exception is narrower than the previous exception that allowed the admission of evidence of past sexual behavior if it
involved the defendant, or if the court concluded that the evidence supported a defendant's defense of consent. 7
Georgia courts have traditionally applied the rape shield statute with
vigor, and this survey year was no exception. In Gibbs v. State, 8 defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence that the victim claimed
defendant had raped her on other occasions. However, defendant ex70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

198 Ga. App. 629, 402 S.E.2d 309 (1991).

Id. at 630, 402 S.E.2d at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631, 402 S.E.2d at 311.
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (Supp. 1991).
Id. § 24-3-3.

77. Id. § 24-2-3.
78. 196 Ga. App. 140, 395 S.E.2d 387 (1990).
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pressly disclaimed consent as a defense by claiming that he was attempting to impeach the credibility of the victim. The court reaffirmed that the
rape shield statute provides "'the exclusive means for admitting evidence
of [] past sexual behavior,'" including the use of such evidence to impeach a witness.7 ' Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of this evidence.10
Similarly, in Moore v. State, 1 the court of appeals held that the trial
court properly excluded evidence of the victim's allegedly lewd behavior
immediately prior to the alleged rape. 8" The court reached this conclusion
because the victim's behavior did not involve defendant, and defendant
was unaware that the incident had occurred; therefore, it could not be
said that this incident could have led defendant to believe that the victim
consented to intercourse."1 The alleged offense in Moore occurred prior to
the effective date of the amendment to the rape shield statute that made
the exception conjunctive rather than disjunctive. Under the new statute,
the evidence clearly would have been inadmissible because it did not involve defendant.
In Smith v. State,"6 the supreme court held that the rape shield statute
does not bar the admission of evidence that an alleged victim made false
accusations of sexual misconduct against third parties."1 However, in
Smith, the court held that before evidence of such alleged false accusations can be introduced, the trial court must make an initial determination concerning whether "a reasonable probability of falsity exists."'" In
Allison v. State," defendant contended the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant had not established with reasonable probability
that previous allegations of rape made by the victim were false. Defendant did, however, elicit testimony from the victim in which she admitted
making the accusation (which she contended was true), and produced an
independent third party who testified that the accusation was false."' The
79. Id. at 141, 395 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 280, 246

S.E.2d 363, 365 (1978)).
80. Id.
81. 195 Ga. App. 814, 395 S.E.2d 13 (1990).
82. Id. at 815, 395 S.E.2d at 14.

83. Id.
84. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3 (1982). The rape shield statute does not prohibit the introduction
of evidence of an alleged victim's prior false allegations of rape against a third person. Smith
v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 136, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1989). The use of such evidence to impeach a
witness's credibility is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 85-91.
85.

259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989).

86. Id. at 136, 377 S.E.2d at 160.
87. Id. at 138, 377 S.E.2d at 160.

88. 198 Ga. App. 75, 400 S.E.2d 360 (1991).
89. Id. at 76, 400 S.E.2d at 361.
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court of appeals reasoned that defendant "could hardly have made a
clearer showing."0 Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the victim had made
prior false allegations. "
IV. PftVuZGES

Georgia law recognizes an absolute privilege against disclosure .of communications between a patient and his psychiatrist' or psychologist." Although the General Assembly sought to place this privilege on the same
plane as the attorney-client privilege, Georgia courts admittedly have interpreted the privilege "narrowly.""1 In Annandale at Suwanee, Inc. v.
Weatherly," for example, the court of appeals reaffirmed that the privilege encompasses only communications with a psychiatrist and psychologist and does not extend to communications with nurses, attendants, or
other mental health specialists unless it is shown that they were agents of
the psychiatrist or psychologist." Consequently, the court ordered the
production of the treatment records of a mental health facility, excluding
only those reports that detailed direct communications with psychiatrists
and psychologists."
The court of appeals also addressed the discoverability of records of a
mental health facility in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc." Aetna sought production of the medical records of a former
patient at defendant's facility. The patient, a physician, was pursuing an
uninsured motorist claim against Aetna in which he contended that injuries suffered in the accident forced him to switch to a less demanding
specialty. In a deposition, however, the physician admitted that his
change in specialty was prompted by his treatment for alcoholism at
Ridgeview. Aetna sought the production of Ridgeview's records to determine whether the physician's decision to change specialties predated the
accident."
90. Id. at 76-77, 400 S.E.2d at 361.

91. Id. at 77, 400 S.E.2d at 361.
92. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(5) (1982).
93. Id. 1 43-39-16 (1988).
94.: Annandale at Suwanee, Inc. v. Weatherly, 194 Ga. App. 803, 804, 392 S.E.2d 27, 28
(1990).
95. 194 Ga. App. 803, 392 S.E.2d 27 (1990).
96. Id. at 804, 392 S.E.2d at 28 (citing Weksler v. Wekaler, 173 Ga. App. 250, 326 S.E.2d
874 (1985)).

97. Id.
98. 194 Ga. App. 805, 392 S.E.2d 286 (1990).
99. Id. at 805, 392 S.E.2d at 287.
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Ridgeview contended that federal law prohibited the production of the
records. 100 The court of appeals recognized that federal law generally prohibits the disclosure of alcohol abuse treatment records by facilities receiving federal funds, but noted that a court may order the production of
these records for "good cause." 10 1 Federal regulations specifically provide
that these records may be produced "in connection with litigation. . . in
which the patient offers testimony or other evidence pertaining to the
content of the confidential communications." 08 The court of appeals concluded that the physician had placed in issue the reason for his change in
specialties and, therefore, federal law did not prohibit the production of
the records. 108
The court of appeals ordered the trial court to conduct an in camera
inspection of the records to determine whether the physician should produce the records.'0 The court specifically instructed the trial court to determine whether Georgia's psychiatrist-patient privilege 05 would prohibit
the production of the records.'0 6 In this regard, Aetna argued that its
need to defend the civil claim abrogated the doctor's privilege against the
disclosure of his records. Aetna relied upon the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision in Bobo v. State,"0 which held that the psychiatrist-patient privilege "must give way where countervailing interests in the truth-seeking
process demands such a result."" Bobo, however, involved a criminal defendant's claim that the privilege impinged his constitutional right of
confrontation. The court in Bobo specifically noted that the privilege "is
not waived when a party who claims it is seeking to recover damages for
injuries of a mental and emotional nature."'' The court rejected Aetna's
argument that the Bobo balancing test could be applied in a civil case." 0
Of course, for the psychiatrist or psychologist privilege to exist, there
must first be a relationship between the psychiatrist or psychologist and
the patient. The court of appeals decisions in Fulbright v. State"' and In
the Interest of R. M.1" are examples of the court's "narrow" interpretation of the psychiatrist-psychologist privilege. In Fulbright the court of
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 806, 392 S.E.2d at 287.
42 C.F.R. § 2.63(a)(3) (1990).
194 Ga. App. at 807, 392 S.E.2d at 288.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(5) (1982).
194 Ga. App. at 807, 392 S.E.2d at 288.
256 Ga. 357, 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986).
Id. at 360, 349 S.E.2d at 692.
Id. at 358, 349 S.E.2d at 691.
194 Ga. App. at 806, 392 S.E.2d at 288.
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appeals held that the trial court did not err in permitting a psychiatrist,
who had examined defendant to testify.1 The court reasoned that defendant consulted the psychiatrist for the purpose of enlisting his aid in a
related domestic action and not to obtain psychiatric treatment or counseling. 11 4 Similarly, in R. M., the court held that the psychologist-patient
relationship did not exist because the child's father did not consult the
psychologist for treatment, but rather saw him at the instigation of the
Department of Family and Children Services.""
V. WrrNESS

A.

Impeachment by Evidence of Character

11 7
In Jones v. State,1 a decision this survey discussed three years ago,
the supreme court stopped the common prosecution practice of impeaching a defendant through evidence of prior criminal activity when a defendant has testified to less than all of his prior criminal offenses.11 8 Prosecutors still have difficulty complying with this change in the law.
In Cross v.State, 9 the prosecutor asked defendant if he had ever used
drugs and defendant responded that he had not. The prosecutor then announced, in the presence of the jury, that she intended to introduce evidence of a chemical test revealing traces of an illicit drug in defendant's
body fluids. The trial court permitted the prosecutor to introduce this
evidence. On appeal, the State argued that this evidence was admissible
to impeach defendant's testimony that he did not use drugs.1 20 The court
of appeals summarily rejected this argument and noted its disapproval of
of the
the prosecution's tactic of trying to "bootstrap" the admissibility
1 1
evidence by eliciting defendant's denial that he had used drugs. 2
Conversely, in Blan v.State,1 22 defendant, who was charged with selling cocaine, testified on direct examination about his conversation with
an undercover agent. During this conversation he told the agent: "I don't
fool with no crack cocaine."'1 ' The trial court then permitted the State to

113. 194 Ga. App. at 828, 392 S.E.2d at 300.
114. Id.
115. 194 Ga. App. at 889, 392 S.E.2d at 14.
116. 257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
117. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERcZR L. REv. 225, 245-46 (1988).
118. 257 Ga. at 760, 363 S.E.2d at 535.
119. 196 Ga. App. '714, 397 S.E.2d 125 (1990).
120. Id. at 715, 397 S.E.2d at 126.
121. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 197 Ga. App. 299, 398 S.E.2d 285 (1990); Jarrard v.
State, 195 Ga.. App. 671, 394 S.E.2d 555 (1990).
122. 198 Ga. App. 671, 402 S.E.2d 782 (1991).
123. Id. at 671, 402 S.E.2d at 783.
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impeach this testimony with evidence of defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine. 114 The court of appeals concluded that defendant's
statement could be construed as a denial that he had ever had any involvement with cocaine, and thus he opened the door to impeachment
with evidence that he had been convicted of possession of cocaine.""
B. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction
Georgia law governing the use of convictions to impeach a witness provides an excellent illustration of why the proposed Georgia Rules of Evidence should be adopted. Remarkably, the Georgia Evidence Code does
not address the use of convictions for impeachment purposes. However,
common law permits the use of a felony conviction or other crime involving moral turpitude to impeach a witness's character.'" This lack of statutory guidance creates much confusion in Georgia concerning the use of
convictions for impeachment. During the survey period, however, the supreme court dispelled one area of confusion.
As reported in last year's survey of Georgia evidence law,1 27 the court of
appeals held, in Pender v. Witcher,"'s that a witness could be impeached
with evidence of a First Offender Act'0 conviction. During this survey
period, however, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals. 8 0 The
supreme court acknowledged that a witness in either a criminal or a civil
case can be impeached by evidence of a conviction for a felony or crime of
moral turpitude.' 8' O.C.G.A. provides, however, that upon satisfaction of
the Act's requirements, a defendant is discharged without an adjudication
of guilt and "shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction."'
Thus, because a plea under the Act does not result in a final conviction, it
does not fall within the general rule that convictions are admissible to
impeach character. The court noted that its decision did not affect the
holding in Hightower v. General Motors Corp."' that evidence of a first
a
offender record may be used in a civil case to disprove or to contradict
4
witness's testimony, but not to impeach his character generally."8
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
S.E.2d
134.

Id. at 672, 402 S.E.2d at 783.
Id.
THoMAS F. GmN, GzoRGIA LAW oF Evmzicz5 139 (3d ed. 1988).
See Treadwell, 8upra note 31, at 223.
194 Ga. App. 72, 389 S.E.2d 560 (1989).
O.C.G.A. J§ 42-8-60 to -65 (1991).
Witcher v. Pender, 260 Ga. 248, 392 S.E.2d 6 (1990).
Id. at 248, 392 S.E.2d at 8.
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-62(a) (1991).
175 Ga. App. 112, 332 S.E.2d 336 (1985), aff'd on other grounds, 255 Ga. 349, 338
426 (1986).
260 Ga. at 249, 392 S.E.2d at 8.
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C. Sequestration of Witnesses (and Now Parties)
The court of appeals opinion in Justice v. Kern & Co.' 8 is a disturbing
decision for lawyers representing plaintiffs in personal injury actions. For
these lawyers, it represents a potentially tremendous tactical advantage.
The court in Justice held that a trial court may properly order a plaintiff
to either testify first or be sequestered during the testimony of witnesses
called by the plaintiff."3' This holding emanates from the supreme court's
decision in Barber v. Barber,18 ' a decision discussed in a previous survey
of Georgia evidence law.1 38 In Barber, a divorce action, the supreme court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by "offering" plaintiff
the option of either testifying first or remaining outside the courtroom
while other witnesses testified.1 s1 Three justices strongly dissented, arguing that the sequestration of a party violated that party's constitutional
140

rights.

One's opinion regarding the wisdom of the Justice holding probably
turns on whether one primarily represents plaintiffs or defendants in personal injury actions. Clearly, however, the holding raises many questions.
For example, to what extent is an attorney for a sequestered plaintiff prohibited from communicating with her client? Further, from a purely logical perspective, it would seem that a defendant should be subject to sequestration as well. Lawyers conceivably could find themselves in a trial
where neither party appears until after the plaintiff has testified.
D. Impeachment and Examination of Witnesses Generally
Georgia law provides that a party is entitled to a "thorough and sifting
cross-examination" of the witnesses called against him."" Further, "[t]he
state of a witness's feelings towards the parties and his relationship to
them may always be proved for the consideration of the jury. 142 Thus, in
Boggs v. States,1 4 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred
when it refused to allow a criminal defendant to cross-examine the victim
14
about a pending damage suit filed by the victim against defendant. 4
135. 197 Ga. App. 270, 398 S.E.2d 223 (1990).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 272, 398 S.E.2d at 224.

143.

195 Ga. App. 605, 394 S.E.2d 401 (1990).

257 Ga. 488, 360 S.E.2d 574 (1986).
See Treadwell, supra note 117, at 247.
257 Ga. at 488, 366 S.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 490-92, 360 S.E.2d at 576-78 (Marshall, C.J., Smith & Bell, JJ., dissenting).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (1982).
Id. § 24-9-68.

144. Id. at 606, 394 S.E.2d at 402.
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Georgia law also provides that a party "may avail himself of allegations
or admissions made in the pleadings of the other" even though those
pleadings have not been admitted in evidence. 14 Thus, in Carver v.
Saye,'4 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it prevented plaintiff from cross-examining defendant about his answer unless
plaintiff first introduced the answer into evidence.1'"
In Pryor v. State,'4 ' the court of appeals reaffirmed that it is not necessary for a party to show surprise before impeaching his owm witness. '' A
party may impeach his own witness with a prior inconsistent statement
even though he knows in advance that the witness's testimony will be in
conflict with the prior statement."50
As discussed elsewhere in this Article,1 ' child molestation cases present several complex evidentiary issues. During the survey period, the
General Assembly enacted legislation to address problems presented by
child victims testifying in open court and in the presence of the defendant. O.C.G.A. section 17-8-55, which became effective April 16, 1991, provides that the testimony of a child under age ten in a molestation case
may be presented by means of a two-way closed circuit television."' The
statute provides that only the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, technicians, and the judge are to be present with the child during his testimony.15 s Although the defendant is not allowed to be in the room with
the child, the statute provides that the defendant can "communicate with
the persons in the room ... by any appropriate electronic method.""54 In
addition, the statute expressly provides that it shall not preclude the appearance of the child in the courtroom for the purpose of identifying the
defendant."'5
VI. OPINION EVIDENCE
A.

Subject Matter of Opinion Evidence

During this survey period, as in past survey periods, Georgia courts
struggled with the question of whether an expert in a child molestation
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

O.C.G.A. § 24-3.30 (1982).
198 Ga. App. 146, 400 S.E.2d 683 (1990).
Id. at 147, 400 S.E.2d at 684.
198 Ga. App. 588, 402 S.E.2d 338 (1991).
Id. at 588, 402 S.E.2d at 339.

Id.
See infra notes 152-97, 206, 228-31, 249-62 and accompanying text.
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1991).

Id.
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Id. § 17-8-55(h).
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prosecution can testify that the victim was, in fact, molested. Indeed, in
the five years that the author has written survey articles, it can safely be
said that this has been the most difficult evidentiary issue which the appellate courts have faced. Unfortunately, the issue remains unresolved.
This dilemma is understandable because prosecutors often face enormous
difficulties in prosecuting alleged child molesters, particularly when their
case depends almost entirely upon the testimony of the victim. Defendants, of course, strenuously object to a witness, buttressed by the title of
expert, telling a jury that the alleged victim was, in fact, molested, particularly when there is little or no physical evidence to substantiate the
charge. The dilemma is aggravated by the wrenching emotional factors in
molestation cases.
Unfortunately, two apparently conflicting supreme court decisions have
exacerbated the difficulties inherent in this issue. In State v. Butler,'"
the supreme court, with three justices dissenting, held that an expert
could testify that a child had been sexually molested. 1 7 The dissent argued that such testimony is merely a prosecutorial mechanism to bolster
the child's credibility, and that it completely usurps the function of the
jury. ' " Perhaps mindful of these concerns, the supreme court in Allison
v. State'" held that a psychologist could not testify that an alleged molestation victim had been sexually abused.'" Specifically, the court held
that while a psychologist could testify as to the "lineaments" of the child
abuse syndrome, he could not testify regarding whether the child suffered
abuse, because this was a question that the jury was fully capable of answering on its own.161 Since these decisions, the court of appeals has
struggled with this issue, pointedly noting that the supreme court has issued conflicting decisions. 16' The present survey period is no exception.
In Coxwell v. State,'6" defendant contended that the trial court erred
when it allowed a social worker to state her opinion that the child victim
had been sexually molested.'" Although the opinion is not explicit on this
point, it appears that the witness was qualified as an expert based upon
her experience and training in relating to sexually molested children. The
court of appeals noted the conflict between Butler and Allison and resolved this conflict in favor of Allison because Allison, decided four
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.'
162.
163.
164.

256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
Id. at 450-51, 349 S.E.2d at 686.
Id. at 452, 349 S.E.2d at 687 (Smith, J., dissenting).
256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
Id. at 853, 353 S.E.2d at 808.
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See, e.g., Miller v. State, 189 Ga. App. 587, 376 S.E.2d 901 (1988).
195 Ga. App. 751, 395 S.E.2d 38 (1990).
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months after Butler, represented the supreme court's more recent expression on this issue. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the trial
court erred in allowing the social worker to testify that the victim had
been sexually molested.1 "
Conversely, in Hall v. State,1" the court of appeals relied upon Allison
to hold that expert evidence of the alleged sexual abuse was properly admitted. 167 The apparent distinction between Hall and Coxwell is that in
Hall the expert did not specifically testify that the victim had been molested. Rather, the expert testified concerning the components of the
child sexual accommodation syndrome. Other witnesses then testified
that the victim exhibited behavior consistent with the syndrome.1 "1Thus,
in Hall the prosecution did not cross the line by eliciting testimony from
an expert that the victim was, in fact, molested.
In Sims v. State,1'6 the supreme court had an opportunity to address
the Butler-Allison conflict but did not do so explicitly. In Sims (which
was before the supreme court because of defendant's constitutional chal-

lenge to O.C.G.A. section

24_9_5,170

which provides a special rule for the

competency of children in child molestation cases), defendant argued that
the trial court improperly allowed a social worker to express her opinion
that the victim had been sexually molested. 71 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that this opinion was impermissibly based on the credibility of the victim. 17 ' Indeed, the social worker based her opinion only on
the victim's account of the incident, which included a demonstration using anatomically correct dolls. 17 3 The supreme court concluded that the
inference to be drawn from this evidence was not beyond the ken of the
jurors and that they could decide for themselves whether the victim had
been molested.'1' In a footnote, the supreme court noted that the expert's
testimony was not based upon scientific evidence.' 75 Thus, the supreme
court's decision in Sims sheds no light on the question of when an expert
employing scientific data can testify that a victim has been molested.
Finally, in Harris v. State,'17 the court of appeals, this time relying
upon Butler, held that a physician properly testified in a child molesta165.
166.
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170.
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196 Ga. App. 523, 396 S.E.2d 271 (1990).
Id. at 525, 396 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 523-24, 396 S.E.2d at 272.
260 Ga. 782, 399 S.E.2d 924 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-5 (Supp. 1991).
260 Ga. at 783-84, 399 S.E.2d at 926-27.
Id. at 784, 399 S.E.2d at 927.
Id. at 782-84, 399 S.E.2d at 925-27.
Id. at 784, 399 S.E.2d at 927.
Id. at 784 n.1, 399 S.E.2d at 927 n.1.
198 Ga. App. 503, 402 S.E.2d 62 (1991).

1991]

EVIDENCE

275

tion case that, in his opinion, the child had been sexually molested."
The court of appeals distinguished Allison on the grounds that the physician's opinion was based upon a physical examination rather than the
child abuse accommodation syndrome.7 '
The supreme court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Harris and, in a decision rendered after the survey period, reversed.17 In a two paragraph opinion, the supreme court explained its
position by stating simply that "this issue is controlled by Allison."1 0
Justice Hunt, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Clarke and Justice
Fletcher, wrote that the physician's opinion was admissible under the
holding of Butler.11 According to Justice Hunt, the majority's reversal of
the court of appeals means that it is appropriate for an expert to testify
that findings are "consistent" with molestation but improper to testify
that findings "indicate" that the child was molested. 182 Justice Hunt concluded that the prosecutor 1 should
not be penalized for failing to make
8
such a semantic distinction.

3

The meaning and effect of the supreme court's two-paragraph decision
in Harrisis difficult to discern. It may be, as Justice Hunt suggests, that a
prosecutor can elicit, in effect, the same testimony simply by rewording
the question so that the expert can tailor his answer accordingly.' 4 However, it is also arguable that the supreme court's opinion means that experts cannot testify that a child has been molested and this prohibition
cannot be avoided through semantic niceties.
The court of appeals addressed what perhaps can be called the mirror
image of the Allison-Butler issue in Jennette v. State.6 6 In Jennette de-

fendant, who was charged with child molestation, contended that the trial
court erroneously excluded expert testimony on the "lying child syndrome," and that defendant did not fit the profile of a child molester. 6
Defendant relied upon the supreme court's decision in Smith v. State,"'7
which held evidence of the "battered woman syndrome" admissible. 18
The court in Jennette acknowledged that the rationale of Smith had
been extended to permit the admission of evidence of the "'battered
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id. (Clarke, C.J., Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).

184. Id. (Clarke, C.J., Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).

185. 197 Ga. App. 580, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).
186. Id. at 581, 398 S.E.2d at 736.
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188. 197 Ga. App. at 582, 398 S.E.2d at 736; 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
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child syndrome.' ,i"In both situations the court permitted the admission
of expert testimony to buttress the credibility of, in one case, a woman
claiming justification for the murder of her live-in boyfriend'90 and, in the
other, the molestation of a child. 1 1 Nevertheless, the supreme court
noted that this rationale is not unlimited and, in Sinns v.State,192 refused to extend Smith to allow expert testimony on the voluntariness of a
confession.'"3 The court in Sinns wrote: "[T]he Smith holding was the
result of the need to treat a unique and almost mysterious area of human
response and behavior. The voluntariness of a confession is not a circumstance akin to the complex subject of battered wife syndrome."i" The
court reasoned that the proffered testimony of the lying child syndrome
was intended to attack the credibility and believability of defendant's alleged victims.19 Similarly, testimony that defendant did not meet the
profile of a child molester was intended to bolster the credibility of his
testimony. 19" The court concluded that the determination of which testimony was credible was not a matter beyond the ken of the jurors, and
"did not involve 'unique and mysterious areas of human response' necessitating expert testimony."' '
The court of appeals decisions in Felton v. White'" and Smith v.
Feel " demonstrate, or at least attempt to demonstrate, the confusing line
of demarcation between proper expert testimony and testimony that impermissibly goes to the ultimate conclusion. In Felton a police officer testified that, in his opinion, an accident occurred because both drivers lost
control of their vehicles. The officer testified that his conclusion was
based upon his observations at the scene and a statement by one of the
drivers.200 The court of appeals held that the trial court properly admitted this testimony, noting that the officer's reliance on hearsay did not
render his opinion inadmissible, but only affected the weight of the testimony.' In Smith, however, the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in permitting a police officer to testify that plaintiff's conduct was a
189.
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"contributing factor" in an automobile accident. 03 The court reasoned
that this testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury because
it related to the ultimate issue of negligence.' 0'
In Harwood v. State,'1" the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly admitted expert testimony concerning the mathematical
probabilities of self-rehabilitation of pedophiles.' 5 This testimony was offered to rebut defendant's testimony that he had rehabilitated himself
following earlier incidents of child molestation.'" The court reasoned that
even if this evidence concerned an ultimate issue, namely, the credibility
of defendant's testimony, the subject matter was beyond the understanding of the average layman and, therefore, was an appropriate subject for
expert testimony.20
The court of appeals decision in Conyers Toyota, Inc. v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co.0'" also provides a good illustration of the appropriate parameters of expert testimony. In Conyers an expert testified
that a guy wire for a utility pole was a hazard that should not have been
located in a particular area of a parking lot. Plaintiff then sought to elicit
testimony from this expert that defendant utilities, because of the nature
of their business, should have appreciated the hazard created by the guy
wire. Further, plaintiff sought to establish that its own employees, because they lacked engineering backgrounds, were not in a position to understand the risk.'" The court of appeals held that the trial court properly excluded this evidence because it did not concern a matter beyond
the understanding of the ordinary juror and, further, it called for the witness to speculate." 0
In Fulton County v. Dangerfield,"' the supreme court held that the
trial court improperly permitted an attorney who had represented a condemnee in a zoning matter to testify as an expert concerning the reasons
for the denial of the condemnee's request for a zoning variance. 1' It is
not proper, the court held, for a witness to testify as to the intentions of
8
another."
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In Madden v. Solomon,2 1 4 the court of appeals held that a chiropractor
may testify as to the results of a thermogram.2 15 The court concluded that
the trial court acted within its discretion to find that the chiropractor was
an expert in thermography and qualified to testify as to the results of a
thermographic examination."'0
Finally, in Caldwell v. State,"7 the supreme court held that the trial
court properly admitted DNA identification evidence.218 The supreme
court reaffirmed its rejection of the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence applied in most jurisdictions, which turns on whether the
scientific principles involved have been generally accepted in the scientific community." ' Georgia, however, does not follow this "rule of 'counting heads' in the scientific community .
"...
,220 Rather, the trial court
can make an independent determination of whether the scientific princi'
ples involved have "reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty."'P
B. Expert Witnesses
Determination of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert
"'is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
such discretion will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused.' ,222 Thus,
it is rare that an appellate court will overrule a trial court's conclusion
that a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to give opinion testimony. However, in Goodman v. Lipman,'8 the court of appeals easily
reversed the trial court's conclusion that a physician was not qualified to
testify that another physician was negligent."2 The trial court, incredibly
enough, concluded that the witness was not qualified because he had not
enterejd medical school at the time of the alleged negligent act and he did
not become licensed until five years after defendant's alleged negligence. 25 The court of appeals found absolutely no authority to support
214. 196 Ga. App. 512, 396 S.E.2d 245 (1990).
215. Id. at 513, 396 S.E.2d at 246-47.
216. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 247.
217. 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990).
218. Id. at 286-87, 393 S.E.2d at 441.
219. Id. at 286, 393 S.E.2d at 441.
220. Id. (quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982)).
221. Id. at 286, 393 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting Harper, 249 Ga. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395).
222. Oakridge Village, Inc. v. La Siesta Mobile Home Park, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 539, 540,
203 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1974) (quoting Howard v. State Hwy. Dep't, 117 Ga. App. 280, 282, 160
S.E.2d 204, 206 (1968)).
223. 197 Ga. App. 631, 399 S.E.2d 255 (1990).
224. Id. at 632, 399 S.E.2d at 257.
225. Id. at 631, 399 S.E.2d at 256.
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such a conclusion and remanded the case for a proper determination
of
6
whether the witness possessed the necessary qualifications."

VII.
A.

HEARSAY

Res Gestae

The proposed Georgia Rules of Evidence, if adopted, will abolish the
res gestae doctrine. From a strict academic standpoint, the res gestae
doctrine is an abomination, and its demise is long overdue 2 7 Arguably,
however, the res gestae doctrine serves a perversely legitimate purpose by
allowing courts to admit evidence that is not admissible under any "legitimate" theory, but which justice demands should be admitted.
An example of the justifiable admission of what clearly is inadmissible
evidence is perhaps found in Dean v. State.228 In Dean, a child molestation case, the trial court admitted evidence of a statement made by a
child to his mother implicating defendant, the child's father. The child
did not testify at trial because he was incompetent. Notwithstanding defendant's lack of opportunity to examine the child, the trial court admitted the mother's testimony of the child's statement under the res gestae
doctrine .' Dean is reminiscent of a case reported in a previous survey
issue, Ward v. State.230 In Ward the court of appeals conclusion that
statements made by the child twenty-four hours after the alleged act of
molestation were admissible, (notwithstanding the incompetency of the
child to testify), prompted a vigorous dissent by four judges. 1 Child molestation cases are difficult and gut wrenching, and one can make a strong
argument that courts should relax the rules of evidence to serve the need
of effective and sure prosecution. Of course, it can also be said that hard
cases make bad law.
The breadth of the res gestae doctrine is also illustrated by the supreme court decision in Phillips v. State."' In Phillips the court held
that the trial court properly admitted two declarations of decedent concerning the cause of her death.2 33 First, on the morning after defendant
226. Id. at 632, 399 S.E.2d at 256.
227. See, eg., Justice Weltner's laconic lament of the res gestae "Gordian Knot," Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 227, 290 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1982).
228. 198 Ga. App. 133, 401 S.E.2d 40 (1990).
229. Id. at 135, 401 S.E.2d at 42.
230. 186 Ga. App. 503, 368 S.E.2d 139 (1988). See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41
Mmcz L. Rav. 175, 201-02 (1989).
231. 186 Ga. App. at 505, 368 S.E.2d at 141 (Carley, Sagner, Pope & Benham, JJ.,
dissenting).
232. 260 Ga. 742, 399 S.E.2d 202 (1991).
233. Id. at 744, 399 S.E.2d at 204.
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allegedly beat the decedent severely, and upon her admission to the hospital, the decedent, although "traumatized and unable to communicate,'2 4 made statements such as "[s]top it, Michael, don't do that
Michael," and "I'm sorry, Michael.'" The next day, after being informed
that she probably would not survive, the decedent stated that she did not
remember what had happened except that she was attacked from behind
while defendant was in the room.2" Clearly, the second statement was
admissible as a dying declaration because the decedent was conscious of
her condition and the statement concerned the person who had attacked
her. ' 7 Just as clearly, the first statement would not be admissible as a
dying declaration because there was no evidence that the decedent was
aware of her condition. Indeed, the evidence clearly established that the
decedent was not lucid at the time she made the first statement. The
court did not address this in the body of its opinion but stated in a footnote that the first statement would be admissible under O.C.G.A. section
24-3-3,"' the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 3 9
B. Admissions by a Party Opponent
In a previous survey, the author discussed the confusion in Georgia law
surrounding the admissibility of admissions by a party opponent, in particular, admissions by an agent of a party opponent24 0 This confusion can
be contrasted with the clear statement of the Federal Rules of Evidence
that admissions by a party opponent are not hearsay, and that an admission by an agent of a party opponent is admissible if it concerns "a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. 's2' Under Georgia law, it would appear,
although it is far from clear, that admissions by a party opponent are
hearsay but may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.24'
During the present survey year, the court of appeals addressed the issue of admissibility of admissions by an agent in Uniflex Corp. v.
Saxon."'s In Saxon defendant asserted there had been an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's claim, contending that a check in settlement of the
claim had been forwarded to plaintiff's Florida attorney. Plaintiff denied,
234. Id. at 743, 399 S.E.2d at 204.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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however, that he had authorized the Florida attorney to negotiate on his
behalf and claimed he had not received any proceeds from the check. Defendant, on appeal from a judgment entered in plaintiff's favor, contended that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a statement
made by one of plaintiff's attorneys indicating that plaintiff had, retained
the Florida attorney to collect the debt. " Apparently, the trial court admitted this evidence to impeach the second attorney's denial that he ever
made such a statement, but did not admit it as direct evidence that the
Florida attorney was the plaintiff's agent. Defendant argued that evidence of the statement of the second attorney was admissible under
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-33, which provides that admissions by an agent
made during the existence and in pursuance of the agency are admissible
against a principal." The court of appeals reasoned, however, that this
code section must be viewed in the light of O.C.G.A. section 10-6-64,
which provides that admissions by an agent are not admissible against
the principal "unless they were part of [the negotiation constituting] the
res gestae."'" The court held that "the [second] attorney's statements
were not part of the transaction at issue in the case but were hearsay as
'' 7
to plaintiff and were not admissible against him as direct evidence. 12
This conclusion should be of particular interest to attorneys. It would
seem that admissions made by an attorney concerning a disputed matter,
during litigation over the disputed matter, are not admissible
because
'
they are not "part of the res gestae of the transaction. "

C.

Child Hearsay Statute

Georgia's child hearsay statute permits a witness to testify about statements made by a child describing sexual conduct or physical abuse."
However, before evidence of the child's statement can be admitted, the
child must be "available to testify," and the court must find that "the
circumstances of the statement provides sufficient indicia of reliability."'

5

The vagueness of the statute has raised questions of whether a

child is "available to testify" if the child is found to be incompetent to
testify. As discussed in a previous survey,0 1 the court of appeals in Ward
v. State15 held that an incompetent child was not available to testify.2"
244. Id. at 445, 402 S.E.2d at 68-69.
245. Id. at 446, 402 S.E.2d at 69. See O.C.G.A. § 24-3-33 (Supp. 1991).
246. 198 Ga. App. at 446, 402 S.E.2d at 69. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6-64 (1989).
247. 198 Ga. App. at 446, 402 S.E.2d at 69.
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This holding, though obviously correct, had the potential effect of eviscerating the child hearsay statute. Accordingly, the General Assembly, in
1989, amended the competency statute to provide that "in all cases involving child molestation, and in all other criminal cases in which a child
was a victim of or a witness to any crime, any such child shall be competent to testify."''" However, for alleged crimes committed prior to the effective date of the new competency statute, the general rules of competency apply. In two decisions concerning the same offense, the court of
appeals addressed the point in time at which the competency of a witness
is to be determined. In Hunnicutt v. State," the court of appeals remanded the case for determination by the trial court of whether the child
was competent and thus "available to testify" under the Child Hearsay
Statute.2" On remand, the trial court ruled the child was competent to
testify."57 On appeal of this ruling, defendant contended the trial court
erred because it determined the child's competency as of the date of the
competency hearing.'" Defendant argued that the child's competency
should have been determined as of the date of the occurrence, when the
child was two years and ten months old, rather than at the time of the
competency hearing, when the child was five years and three months
old."" The court rejected this argument, reasoning that it is only necessary that one be competent at the time testimony is given and there is no
requirement that competency be determined at the time of the out-ofcourt statements.2' 0 Defendant further argued that the trial court erred
by determining the child's competency at the time of the competency
hearing, rather than at the time of the trial. The trial court concluded
that it was impossible to determine the competency of the child at the
time of the trial and merely concluded she was competent as of the date
of the competency hearing.261 The court of appeals ruled that this was
error.2' The pertinent question is whether the child was available to testify at trial, and to be available she must have been competent at that
time. Because the trial court concluded that it could not determine competency as 5of the trial, the court of appeals held that a new trial was
necessary."
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D. Business Records
The court of appeals decision in Hertz Corp. v. McCray'" provides an
excellent outline of Georgia's business records exception to the hearsay
rule.'" In Hertz the trial court refused to admit various documents as
business records, notwithstanding the witness' testimony that he was familiar with the method used by plaintiff in keeping its books and
records.'" Reviewing the business records exception, the court of appeals*
wrote that a witness attempting to lay a foundation for the admission of
business records must be familiar with the method of keeping the records
and must testify that the entries were made in the regular course of business at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter.2" It
is not necessary that this witness have personal knowledge of the correctness of the records, nor is it necessary that he had made the entries himself.2" Significantly, Georgia's business records exception does not require
the testimony of the custodian of the documents to establish that they
are business records. Anyone who is familiar with the method of keeping
the documents can lay the foundation .2 Familiarity, the court continued,
can be acquired in many ways: "The manner in which familiarity is obtained, like the question of whether the witness has personal knowledge
of the particular business entry, goes only to weight and not to document
admissibility."' 70 Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court applied an 1"overly stringent" standard for the admission of the business
7
records.2
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